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The cognitive basis of prosocial behavior has received considerable recent attention.
Previous work using economic games has found that in social dilemmas, intuitive
decisions are more prosocial on average. The Social Heuristics Hypothesis (SHH)
explains this result by contending that strategies which are successful in daily life
become automatized as intuitions. Deliberation then causes participants to adjust to
the self-interested strategy in the specific setting at hand. Here we provide further
evidence for the SHH by confirming several predictions regarding when and for whom time
pressure/delay will and will not alter contributions in a Public Goods Game (PGG). First,
we replicate and extend previous results showing that (as predicted by the SHH) trust of
daily-life interaction partners and previous experience with economic games moderate the
effect of time pressure/delay in social dilemmas. We then confirm a novel prediction of the
SHH: that deliberation should not undermine the decision to benefit others when doing
so is also individually payoff-maximizing. Our results lend further support to the SHH, and
shed light on the role that deliberation plays in social dilemmas.
Keywords: cooperation, economic games, prosociality, moral psychology, dual process
INTRODUCTION
Cooperation is a key component of life, from the cells in our bod-
ies up through our personal and professional interactions and the
relationships between nations, and thus is a major focus of study
across the natural and social sciences (Hardin, 1968; Ostrom,
1990; Batson and Moran, 1999; Milinski et al., 2002; Boyd et al.,
2003; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003; Bartlett and Desteno, 2006;
Levin, 2006; Herrmann et al., 2008; Crockett, 2009; Cushman
and Macindoe, 2009; Goetz et al., 2010; Sigmund, 2010; Zaki and
Mitchell, 2011; Apicella et al., 2012; Espín et al., 2012; Piff et al.,
2012; Rand and Nowak, 2013; Hauser et al., 2014; Peysakhovich
et al., 2014). The individual costs of cooperation, however, pose
a problem: why are people willing to help others? Here we
consider this question using the dual-process model of decision-
making, which posits that decisions can be thought of as resulting
from competition between two general systems (Sloman, 1996;
Stanovich and West, 1998; Chaiken and Trope, 1999; Miller and
Cohen, 2001; Kahneman, 2003; Frederick, 2005): one that is fast,
automatic, and intuitive; and another that is slow, controlled, and
deliberative.
Using this dual-process perspective to consider prosociality,
the following questions arise (Zaki and Mitchell, 2013): are we
intuitively selfish and only cooperate through active self-control?
Or is our automatic predisposition to be cooperative, with delib-
eration favoring selfishness? To shed light on this issue, recent
studies have examined the effect of experimentally manipulating
the level of intuition vs. deliberation on prosociality in economic
games. Doing so using time pressure/delay (Rand et al., 2012,
2014a,b), cognitive load (Cornelissen et al., 2011; Schulz et al.,
2014), or application of transcranial direct current stimulation
to the right lateral prefrontal cortex (Ruff et al., 2013) has sug-
gested that deliberation favors selfishness. Other studies have
found no significant effect of cognitive load (Hauge et al., 2009) or
time pressure (Tinghög et al., 2013; Verkoeijen and Bouwmeester,
2014), but no studies to our knowledge find a significant pos-
itive effect of deliberation on prosociality in economic games.
(Some studies have used decision time correlations to try to gain
insight into the role of intuition vs. deliberation and find oppos-
ing results Rubinstein, 2007; Piovesan and Wengström, 2009;
Rand et al., 2012; Nielsen et al., 2014; recent work, however,
explains these inconsistencies by demonstrating that fast response
times are not a good proxy for intuitive decision-making, and that
actual cognitive processmanipulations are required instead of just
correlational analyses Evans et al., 2014).
To explain this overall negative effect of deliberation on coop-
eration, we have proposed the “Social Heuristics Hypothesis”
(SHH) (Rand et al., 2014b). The SHH adds a dual process per-
spective to previous theories related to cultural differences and
norm internalization (Bowles and Gintis, 2002, 2003; Henrich
et al., 2005, 2010; Chudek and Henrich, 2011). Specifically,
the SHH posits that people adopt strategies that are success-
ful in daily life as default (automatically applied) heuristics for
social interaction. In new or atypical social situations, one’s
first response is to apply these heuristics. Deliberation then
tailors responses to the details of the present situation. Based
on this logic, the SHH makes specific predictions about when
deliberation should and should not undermine one-shot anony-
mous cooperation. In this paper, we test three such predic-
tions by examining cooperation in a one-shot Public Goods
Game (PGG) where decisions are made under time pressure
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(i.e., made more intuitive) or time delay (i.e., made more
deliberative).
First, in a standard one-shot anonymous social dilemma,
intuition should favor the behavior which is typically payoff-
maximizing in one’s lives daily life, while deliberation should
always favor selfishness (because selfishness is payoff maximiz-
ing in one-shot anonymous social dilemmas). The presence in
daily life of repeated interactions, reputation, and the threat of
sanctions typically makes cooperation payoff-maximizing outside
the lab: if others will only cooperate with you when you have
behaved cooperatively in the past, self-interest dictates that you
cooperate; and as a result, most people choose to cooperate under
these circumstances (Axelrod, 1984; Milinski et al., 2002; Dal Bó,
2005; Nowak and Sigmund, 2005; Rand et al., 2009; Dal Bó and
Fréchette, 2011; Fudenberg et al., 2012; Rand and Nowak, 2013).
We argue that this is the case for most subjects in lab experi-
ments, who live in Western communities with strong institutions
and norms of cooperation. Therefore, we expect that most sub-
jects will have high levels of inter-personal trust, and as a result
peoples’ intuitions will favor cooperation on average.
But this should not be true for everyone: even in contexts
where reciprocity is possible, if most of the people you interact
with are defectors, then you maximize your payoff by also defect-
ing (leading to the formation of non-cooperative intuitions).
Therefore, promoting deliberation should only undermine coop-
eration among people whose daily life interaction partners are
cooperative (and thus have developed cooperative intuitions).
People who live in a world where most others are non-cooperative
have defection as their default, and thus should be unaffected
by cognitive process manipulations in the context of one-shot
economic games.
Preliminary support for this prediction comes from the
correlational results of Rand et al. (2012)’s Study 10, where
faster decisions were more cooperative among people with high
interpersonal trust, but decision time did not predict cooperation
among those with low interpersonal trust. (Furthermore, the
median level of trust in Rand et al. (2012)’s Study 10 was 7 on a
10 point scale, and nearly twice as many subjects were above the
scale mid-point as compared to below, supporting our suggestion
that most subjects are trusting). This prediction is also supported
by work showing that exposure to laboratory environments
where cooperation was either advantageous (long repeated
Prisoner’s Dilemma games) or disadvantageous (short repeated
Prisoner’s Dilemmas) influenced subsequent behavior in one-
shot anonymous games among subjects who relied on heuristics,
but not among those who were deliberative (Peysakhovich and
Rand, 2013). Here we seek to test this prediction using an actual
experimental manipulation of cognitive process, rather than just
decision-time correlations or individual differences in cognitive
style.
Second, at the heart of the SHH is overgeneralization: intu-
itive responses from daily life get misapplied in the one-shot
anonymous interactions of the laboratory. Thus, we would not
expect intuitions to favor cooperation among subjects that have
substantial previous experience with one-shot economic game
experiments, as they will have had an opportunity to recalibrate
their automatic responses (or to learn to be on guard against
them). Prior support for this prediction comes from Rand et al.
(2012)’s Study 9, in which a writing exercise that induced an
intuitive mindset resulted in more cooperation than one induc-
ing a deliberative mindset, but only among subjects that were
inexperienced with economic game experiments (i.e., “naïve”).
Additional support comes from Rand et al. (2014b), where (i)
cooperation under time pressure in experiments run on MTurk
systematically decreased over a 2 year period, during which time
the MTurk subject pool became much more experienced with
behavioral experiments, and (ii) this pattern was reproduced in
a single experiment where cooperation was higher under time
pressure than time delay among naïve subjects, but did not differ
based on time constraint among experienced subjects.
There remains some question regarding the role of naivety,
however, as Verkoeijen and Bouwmeester (2014) found no effect
of time pressure/delay in a sample of subjects all reporting to be
naïve (note, however, that in this study naivety was assessed at the
outset of the experiment, and it was made clear that only naïve
subjects would be allowed to participate; thus there is reason to
believe that many subjects may have under-reported their level of
experience). Here, we thus seek to again replicate the moderating
effect of naivety, and to test for the joint moderation of naivety
and interpersonal trust (i.e., intuition is only predicted to favor
cooperation among subjects who are both naïve and trusting).
Third, deliberation should not reduce prosociality in settings
where no conflict exists between the individual and group (such
as the games used in Saijo and Nakamura, 1995; Brandts et al.,
2004; Kummerli et al., 2010). If, because of a modified payoff-
structure, the collectively optimal action is also the individually
optimal action, deliberative decisions should be just as proso-
cial as intuitive decisions. Therefore, we predict that the presence
of a social dilemma should moderate the effect of deliberation
on cooperation. This is not a trivial prediction: if deliberation
was reducing contributions in previous experiments for a rea-
son other than the pursuit of self-interest, for example a desire
to avoid extreme responses, then it should continue to do so even
with this altered payoff structure. Here we present the first test of
this prediction.
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
To assess these three predictions, we recruited 963 American par-
ticipants (38% female, mean age 30.9 years) using the online
labor market Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk; Paolacci et al.,
2010; Buhrmester et al., 2011; Horton et al., 2011; Amir et al.,
2012; Rand, 2012) to play a single one-shot PGG in groups of
four. In keeping with standard wages on MTurk, each participant
received a $0.50 show-up fee, and then chose how much of a 40
cent endowment to keep vs. contribute to a “common project”
(using a radio button with options of 0, 10, 20, 30, and 40 cents,
and having no default selected). All contributions were multiplied
by a factor x and split evenly among the four group members.
Subjects made their decisions asynchronously, and payoffs were
determined using ex post matching. No deception was used, and
this research was approved by the Yale University Human Subjects
Committee.
To manipulate the relative role of intuition vs. deliberation,
a time constraint was imposed on the decision screen. In the
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“Time Pressure” condition, participants were asked to decide
as quickly as possible and given at most 10 s (a timer counted
down from 10). In the “Time Delay” condition, participants were
asked to carefully consider their decision and told to wait at least
10 s before deciding (a timer counted up from 0). Participants
were only notified about the time constraint upon arriving at
the screen where they had to make their contribution decision,
to prevent them from deliberating ahead of time to a greater
extent in the time pressure condition (Rand et al., 2013). A total
of 7.2% of participants did not obey the time constraint. We
include these subjects in our analysis to avoid selection prob-
lems that impair causal inference, as highlighted by Tinghög et al.
(2013).
To evaluate our first two predictions, we set x = 2, creating
a social dilemma: the aggregate payoff of all group members
(i.e., social welfare) is maximized by contributing everything,
but each individual receives only 1 cent back for every 2 cents
contributed and thus loses money on contributing. In a post-
experimental questionnaire, we followed Rand et al. (2012) and
assessed the cooperativeness of participants’ daily life interaction
partners by asking “To what extent do you feel you can trust
other people that you interact with in your daily life?” using
a 7 point scale from “Very little” to “Very much” (mean 4.69,
median 5; 16.8% below mid-point; 61.3% above mid-point). We
also assessed whether participants had previous experience with
economic games by asking “To what extent have you participated
in other studies involving the dividing up of money on MTurk
before taking this HIT?” using a 5 point scale from “Never” to
“Very often.” We follow Rand et al. (2012, 2014b) and categorize
participants as Naïve if they answered “Never” (15% of partici-
pants were Naïve). Combining predictions 1 and 2 we predict a
positive three-way interaction between time pressure, trust, and
naivety, such that increasing intuitiveness increases cooperation
only among subjects who are both trusting and naïve.
We test our third prediction by setting x = 6. Here, the social
dilemma disappears: for each unit a player contributes, she
receives 1.5 units back from the pool, so all players contribut-
ing everything is both socially optimal and individually optimal.
Thus, if deliberation undermines cooperation in social dilem-
mas because of a focus on self-interest, we should find no effect
of manipulating deliberation in this “No Dilemma” condition.
This leads us to predict no effect of time pressure in the No
Dilemma condition, and a positive four-way interaction between
time pressure, trust, naivety, and being in the Social Dilemma
condition.
After making their decision, participants were asked which
contribution amount maximized the group’s payoff ($0.40 in
both Dilemma and No Dilemma conditions), and which amount
maximized their individual payoff ($0.00 in Dilemma, $0.40
in No Dilemma). Comprehension is assessed after the deci-
sion rather than beforehand to avoid inducing a deliberative
mindset, as per (Rand et al., 2012). A total of 31.6% of sub-
jects answered one or both questions incorrectly (this rate of
non-comprehension is well in line with previous studies using
economic games on Mechanical Turk, Horton et al., 2011; Rand
et al., 2012, 2014b; Engel and Rand, 2014). As our central manip-
ulation was the alteration of the payoff structure to remove the
social dilemma in the NoDilemma condition, we exclude subjects
who failed the comprehension questions in our main analyses.
Comparing the Social Dilemma and No Dilemma conditions,
the fraction of subjects incorrectly answering the question about
the socially optimal choice did not vary significantly [Pearson
chi2(1) = 0.10, p = 0.76], but significantly more subjects in the
No Dilemma condition gave the incorrect answer for the indi-
vidually optimal choice [20.0% in Social Dilemma, 41.1% in No
Dilemma, Pearson chi2(1) = 52.9, p < 0.001]. To address poten-
tial selection bias concerns when comparing the Social Dilemma
and No Dilemma conditions, we replicate our cross-condition
analyses including non-comprehenders and show that the results
are qualitatively equivalent.
Our analyses were performed using linear regression with
robust standard errors, taking contribution amount as the
dependent variable.
RESULTS
We begin by examining the Social Dilemma condition (Figure 1,
x = 2) and evaluating our first two predictions regarding the
joint moderation of time pressure by naivety and trust. We find
the predicted positive three-way interaction between time pres-
sure, naivety and trust when predicting contribution (Table 1
Col 2, p = 0.013; including demographic controls: Table 1 Col 3,
p = 0.012): among naïve subjects that are high in trust, time
pressure increases contribution. Moreover, when restricting to
FIGURE 1 | Contributions in the Social Dilemma (x = 2) condition
under time delay (red) and time pressure (blue), among naïve (A) and
non-naïve (B) participants. Within each panel, dot sizes are proportional to
number of observations.
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Table 1 | Linear regressions with robust standard errors predicting
PGG contribution in the Social Dilemma condition.
Social dilemma (x = 2)
(1) (2) (3)
Time pressure (TP) −1.453 (1.655) −4.666 (5.970) −4.594 (6.027)
Naïve 4.018 (2.217) 11.46 (10.33) 12.16 (10.65)
Trust 3.401** (0.570) 3.059** (0.891) 2.982** (0.886)
TP × Naïve −24.17 (12.44) −24.86* (12.59)
TP × Trust 0.570 (1.257) 0.554 (1.260)
Naïve × Trust −1.988 (2.022) −2.020 (2.088)
TP × Naïve × Trust 5.994* (2.390) 6.131* (2.435)
Age 0.172* (0.0804)
Female −0.960 (1.731)
Education dummies No No Yes
Constant 7.063* (2.790) 8.897* (4.097) 27.68** (3.300)
Observations 395 395 395
R-squared 0.088 0.102 0.125
Subjects failing the comprehension questions are excluded.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
**p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.
subjects that are both naïve and have above median trust (the
group the SHH predicts should have cooperative intuitions),
time pressure significantly increases contribution relative to time
delay (coeff = 11.7, p = 0.023). Thus, we confirm our first two
predictions.
Next we evaluate our third prediction by examining the effect
of time pressure on contribution in the No Dilemma condition
(Figure 2). As predicted, we find no significantmain effect of time
pressure (Table 2 Col 1, p = 0.93), and no significant interactions
involving time pressure (Table 2 Col 3 and 4, all p > 0.40).
To support the meaningfulness of this null result, we conduct
a power calculation based on the meta-analysis of Rand et al.
(2014b) where the average effect of time pressure in PGGs was
found to be an increase in contribution of 7.22% of the endow-
ment. Our sample size of 292 comprehending subjects in the No
Dilemma condition is large enough to detect an effect of that size
with power of 0.84. Therefore, it is unlikely that we failed to find
a significant effect due to lack of power.
Furthermore, our central prediction was not this null result,
but instead a predicted positive four-way interaction between
time pressure, naivety, trust and a Social Dilemma dummy when
combining data from both conditions. Indeed, we find this four-
way interaction to do be significant (Table 3 Col 1, p = 0.028;
including demographic controls: Table 3 Col 2, p = 0.028).
Furthermore, when restricting to subjects that are both naïve
and have a higher-than-median level of trust, we find a signif-
icant positive interaction between time pressure and the Social
Dilemma condition (p = 0.005). Thus, we confirm our third
prediction.
We now address potential concerns related to selection effects
arising from the fact that more subjects failed the comprehension
question regarding individually optimal behavior (and thus were
excluded) in the No Dilemma condition. To do so, we include
all subjects regardless of whether they failed the comprehension
FIGURE 2 | Contributions in the No Dilemma (x = 6) condition under
time delay (red) and time pressure (blue), among naïve (A) and
non-naïve (B) participants. Within each panel, dot sizes are proportional to
number of observations.
Table 2 | Linear regressions with robust standard errors predicting
PGG contribution in the No Dilemma condition.
No dilemma (x = 6)
(1) (2) (3)
Time pressure (TP) −0.0847 (0.998) 3.632 (6.163) 2.898 (6.308)
Naïve −2.305 (1.598) −10.23 (10.13) −12.83 (10.50)
Trust 0.925 (0.533) 1.186 (0.905) 0.771 (0.982)
TP × Naïve 8.817 (14.51) 9.877 (14.59)
TP × Trust −0.791 (1.205) −0.601 (1.227)
Naïve × Trust 1.598 (1.670) 2.228 (1.753)
TP × Naïve × Trust −1.680 (2.543) −1.958 (2.570)
Age 0.0865** (0.0316)
Female 1.055 (0.879)
Education dummies No No Yes
Constant 32.62** (2.879) 31.37** (4.769) 34.32** (3.751)
Observations 292 292 292
R-squared 0.027 0.036 0.065
Subjects failing the comprehension questions are excluded.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
**p < 0.01.
questions, and add a control for failing comprehension. We also
include an interaction between the Social Dilemma dummy and
the failed comprehension dummy, because in the Social Dilemma
condition, comprehension failure (i.e., not understanding it is a
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Table 3 | Linear regressions with robust standard errors predicting PGG contribution across both conditions.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Time pressure (TP) 3.632 (6.150) 4.126 (6.237) −4.467 (5.457) −4.827 (5.457)
Naïve −10.23 (10.11) −12.99 (10.42) −24.27** (8.647) −25.29** (8.541)
Trust 1.186 (0.903) 0.936 (0.961) 0.283 (0.842) 0.0926 (0.867)
Social dilemma (SD) −22.47** (6.284) −22.89** (6.403) −26.33** (5.761) −26.57** (5.798)
TP × Naïve 8.817 (14.48) 9.129 (14.69) 22.35* (10.81) 21.53* (10.97)
TP × Dilemma −8.299 (8.578) −8.958 (8.608) 1.401 (7.783) 1.463 (7.773)
TP × Trust −0.791 (1.202) −0.807 (1.216) 0.924 (1.100) 1.014 (1.099)
Naïve × SD 21.69 (14.46) 24.38 (14.72) 37.44** (13.21) 38.76** (13.31)
Naïve × Trust 1.598 (1.666) 2.305 (1.732) 4.289** (1.532) 4.577** (1.516)
Trust × SD 1.873 (1.269) 2.029 (1.295) 2.846* (1.169) 2.907* (1.176)
TP × Naïve × SD −32.99 (19.10) −33.24 (19.26) −37.04* (17.18) −36.40* (17.43)
TP × Naïve × Trust −1.680 (2.537) −1.781 (2.577) −3.915* (1.985) −3.748 (2.019)
TP × Trust × SD 1.360 (1.741) 1.414 (1.744) −0.943 (1.593) −0.944 (1.590)
Naïve × Trust × SD −3.585 (2.623) −4.172 (2.666) −6.857** (2.526) −7.143** (2.557)
TP × Naïve × Trust × SD 7.673* (3.489) 7.734* (3.522) 7.957* (3.374) 7.803* (3.430)
Failed Comprehension −7.813** (1.107) −7.676** (1.116)
Failed Comprehension × SD 11.50** (2.133) 11.19** (2.160)
Age 0.139** (0.0467) 0.0871* (0.0433)
Female −0.112 (1.071) 0.0900 (0.917)
Education dummies No Yes No Yes
Constant 31.37** (4.759) 41.94** (8.509) 35.61** (4.305) 37.83** (7.792)
Observations 687 687 963 962
R-squared 0.276 0.291 0.214 0.223
Subjects failing the comprehension questions are excluded in columns 1 and 2, and included in columns 3 and 4.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
**p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.
dilemma) would be expected to increase giving, whereas com-
prehension failure in the No Dilemma condition (i.e., not under-
standing that there is no dilemma) would be expected to decrease
giving. Doing so, we continue to find a significant four-way inter-
action between time pressure, naivety, trust and being in the
Social Dilemma condition (Table 3 Col 3, p = 0.019; with demo-
graphic controls: Table 3 Col 4, p = 0.023). Thus, the difference
we showed above in the effect of time pressure between the
Social Dilemma and No Dilemma conditions is not the result of
excluding non-comprehenders.
Finally, we note that there is no evidence of a potentially con-
founding relationship between trust and naivety: trust levels do
not differ significantly between naïve and experienced subjects
[t-test, t(960) = −0.05, p = 0.96].
DISCUSSION
Here we have examined the effect of aligning individual and
group incentives on intuitive (time pressured) and reflective (time
delayed) public goods provisioning. We extended earlier results
(Rand et al., 2012, 2014b) by showing that time pressure increased
cooperation in a social dilemma only among participants who
were both naïve and trusting. We then showed that promoting
intuition had no effect on cooperation when the conflict between
individual and collective incentives was removed (by making con-
tribution individually payoff maximizing). These results confirm
our predictions generated by the SHH (Rand et al., 2014b),
and provide evidence that deliberation undermines cooperation
in social dilemmas specifically by leading participants toward
self-interest.
An important limitation of the current study is that our assess-
ment of the moderating roles of trust and prior experience takes
an individual differences approach, rather than an experimen-
tal approach. Both of these measures are self-reports, and thus
may be prone to inaccuracy. Moreover, the trust measure used
here (and in Rand et al., 2012) is a generalized trust measure,
which may be less effective at tapping into trust in interpersonal
interactions than other more targeted measures (Simpson, 2007).
One might also worry that choosing to cooperate in the PGG
makes people report a high level of trust in the subsequent demo-
graphics questionnaire. However, our data suggest that this is
not so: if this was the case, we should expect a main effect of
trust on cooperation and not the interaction that we observe.
The three-way interaction we find between trust, experience,
and condition (Prediction 1) provides some evidence that time
pressure makes people more cooperative when they are trusting
and inexperienced, rather than trust making people more cooper-
ative overall. Further, subjects learned the outcome of the group
decision after making trust judgments. Therefore, it is not pos-
sible that the behavior of the group affected trust judgments.
Nonetheless, future work should examine the effect of directly
manipulating trust and experience on cooperation under time
pressure/delay.
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Another important limitation involves our study’s sample size.
Although we recruited a large number of subjects (N = 963),
our four-way interaction structure (payoff structure × time con-
straint × trust of daily life interaction partners × naivety) and
high rate of comprehension failure meant that we wound up
with relatively few subjects in each bin. In particular, we had
only 34 subjects who were naïve, had higher than median trust,
and passed the comprehension checks. Thus, future studies are
needed, using even larger sample sizes, to assess the robustness of
our findings.
The SHH predicts that prior experience with economic games
will reduce the effect of time pressure in the social dilemma
(Rand et al., 2012, 2014b). The mechanism by which this occurs,
however, remains somewhat unclear. There are two possibil-
ities. One is that with sufficient experience, subjects develop
new default responses tailored to one-shot anonymous games.
Alternatively, it could be that experience with economic game
experiments (and psychological experiments more generally)
does not change subjects’ default responses, but instead teaches
them not to rely on those defaults; repeatedly exposing subjects
to situations in which their defaults lead them astray may under-
mine their faith in the accuracy of their intuitions. The present
study helps to differentiate between these possibilities in two
different ways.
First, the No Dilemma condition lets us look for evidence of
remodeled intuitions. If subjects developed new non-cooperative
defaults for one-shot economic games (where it is typically pay-
off maximizing to not contribute), we might expect time pres-
sure to reduce cooperation among experienced subjects in the
No Dilemma condition: remodeled intuitions would favor non-
contribution while deliberation would cause people to realize that
contributing was payoff-maximizing in the variant. Yet we find
no significant effect of time pressure among experienced subjects
in the No Dilemma condition (coeff = −0.34, p = 0.737). Thus,
it seems our subjects have not developed new non-cooperative
intuitions.
Second, we do find evidence that experienced subjects are
more skeptical of their intuitive responses. As an exploratory
measure, our post-experimental questionnaire included one item
from the “Faith in intuition” scale (Epstein et al., 1996) which
asks how much subjects agree with the statement “I trust my ini-
tial feelings about people” using a 5 point Likert scale from “Very
untrue” to “Very true.” This particular item was selected because
Epstein et al. (1996) found it to be the item that loadedmost heav-
ily on their “faith in intuition” factor. We find that among those
passing the comprehension checks, naïve subjects report signif-
icantly higher agreement (Mean 3.893, SE 0.085) compared to
experienced subjects [Mean 3.700, SE 0.035; t-test t(685) = 2.12,
p = 0.034]. In particular, naïve subjects are significantly more
likely to report maximum agreement [“Very true”; naïve 24.3%,
experienced 14.4%; chi2(1) = 6.41, p = 0.011]. Although the
magnitudes of these differences are not so large, they provide
preliminary evidence that experience with experiments under-
mines subjects’ faith in their intuition, rather than remodeling the
contents of those intuitions.
Based on the SHH, one might expect that in the No Dilemma
condition, time pressure would decrease cooperation in low-trust
subjects (because their intuitions should favor selfishness, while
deliberation makes them realize that here it is advantageous to
contribute). While we did not observe such an interaction, this
is likely the result of having very few truly low-trust subjects in
our sample (only 16.8% of subjects reported trust levels below the
mid-point of the scale). Thus, we did not have sufficient power to
detect such an effect. Examining this possibility is an important
direction for future work, perhaps using cross-cultural studies in
cultures with overall lower trust.
In addition to illuminating the cognitive underpinnings of
cooperation, our findings may have important implications for
policies aimed at increasing contributions to the public good.
They suggest that in situations where people believe that it is indi-
vidually costly for them to contribute, deliberation may under-
mine cooperation. However, when it is clear that contribution is
good for the individual as well as for the group, cooperation is safe
from negative effects of deliberation. Therefore, wherever organi-
zation structures are aimed at aligning individual and collective
interests, such as reputation systems or profit sharing, this align-
ment should be made salient. Not only could this increase overall
cooperation, but it could in particular facilitate cooperation in the
contexts that rely on rational, deliberative decision-making.
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